Ramanambonona Ambinintsoa

This paper focuses on extending optimal law enforcement models to analyze the mechanisms of deterrence and damage compensation within a penal system under social cost criteria. We particularly examine the crucial distinction between arrest and punishment, as well as the policy and economic implications of optimal deterrence strategies. Our results show that the balance between deterrence and compensation depends strongly on the probability of detection and the severity of sanctions, thereby providing concrete insights to improve public policies in the field of law and economics

This paper discusses the economic approach to deterring foreign exchange violations in the context of law enforcement in Madagascar. In order to find an optimal level of monetary sanction, the setting of the fine rate applied is based on one or more well-defined criteria such as the seriousness of the exchange infraction. According to the economic literature on law enforcement, the penalty achieves a level of intended deterrence if it is greater than or at least equal to the benefit expected by the offender. Inspired by this idea, we propose a new approach so that if the benefit obtained by the offender is not observable, the fine should at least equal the expected benefit, and if the benefit is observable, the fine should equal the observed benefit. In the case of foreign exchange violations, the proposed fine rate is the rate of irregularity committed by the economic agent, which should be flexible and dynamic. The results show that the firm with a high rate of irregularity has an incentive to respect the regulation more because the fine rate applied is high. At a certain level, it respects the law until the amount of the fine is tolerable. Finally, a firm with a low rate of irregularity is deterred from keeping this rate relatively low to avoid being fined by the high rate of fine..

This paper attempts to analyze the macroeconomic effects of corruption based on time series data (2002-2020) for Madagascar. The VAR(p) model is used to explore the relationships between the corruption perception index and macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita growth, income per capita growth, inflation rate, and unemployment rate. However, the results of this analysis are inconclusive. Therefore, VECM models are used to explore short- and long-term stability relationships between variables, taking into account whether or not they are cointegrated. The results indicate that there is a long-term relationship between per capita income and GDP growth and the corruption perception index. Responses to shocks suggest a positive relationship between GDP per capita growth and per capita income growth, as well as a negative relationship between GDP per capita growth and the corruption perception index. Changes in the corruption perception index have an effect on all the variables studied. The Granger causality test showed that positive changes in the corruption index cause GDP per capita growth, but causality does not work in the other direction. Improvements in the fight against corruption lead to an increase in per capita income, but not vice versa.

The article argues that adaptive expectations play a role in deterrence and punishment by suggesting that offenders who have experienced the punishment before may expect a hight level of punishment if caught again. Therefore, punishing repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders can lead to better deterrence because it creates a higher cost for offenders, which is offset by the high deterrence of the combined sanction, including loss of liberty and high financial costs. This can make it too costly for offenders to justify illegal activity and reduce recidivism rates.

This paper examines the optimal combination of fines and imprisonment as a means of deterring harmful behavior. We review the existing literature on this area and propose a model that takes into account the public cost of incarceration and the financial capacity of the offender. The result show that the optimal probability of arrest and conviction is a function of the public cost of incarceration, and that the maximum monetary penalty constitutes an optimal deterrent for affluent offenders. For insolvent offenders, the emphasis is on dosing the length of imprisonment, as the maximum fine may exceed their wealth. We conclude that the optimal fine size can vary according to specific circumstances, and that cost-effectiveness plays a crucial role in determining the type and magnitude of punishment.